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[A] green, renewable energy economy isn’t some pie-in-the-sky, 
far-off future, it is now.  It is creating jobs, now. . . .  And it can 
create millions of additional jobs and entire new industries if we act 
now.1 
Government actors, as well as the public at large, are beginning to 
realize the old argument that we must choose between environmental 
responsibility and prosperity is a false dichotomy.  The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (ARRTA) explicitly 
embraces renewable energy as a growing industry with great potential 
 
1 Senator Barack Obama, A Serious Energy Policy for Our Future, Remarks at a 2008 
Presidential Campaign Event in Las Vegas, Nevada (June 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/06/24/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_81.php. 
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to rebuild the flagging economy.2  The wind energy industry is a 
major player in renewable energy production, and its success is vitally 
important to overcoming the obstacles the United States faces during 
the current recession.  The government incentives and the unique 
financing arrangements that were built around those incentives have 
driven a successful expansion of the industry over the past four 
years.3  This success shows that the wind energy industry is well 
positioned to play a key role in creating high-paying American jobs, 
promoting a sustainable low-carbon society, and fighting climate 
change.  However, the fallout from the collapse of the U.S. financial 
sector has had a disproportionately negative effect on the wind energy 
industry.4  The mixture of tightening credit markets, huge losses in the 
financial sector, and plunging energy prices has exposed the 
shortcomings of using tax credits to spur development in renewable 
energy and has brought the emerging multi-billion dollar wind energy 
industry to a standstill.5  Accordingly, the outlook for wind energy 
development in 2009 and beyond is mired in uncertainty.6 
As a relatively young industry, wind energy is especially 
susceptible to the market downturn because it cannot continue to 
grow without financial backing.  Since 2000, that financial backing 
has been encouraged by high fossil fuel prices and generous tax 
incentives for the production of renewable energy.7  The drop in fossil 
fuel prices and the astronomical losses suffered by the financial sector 
during the recession have eliminated the short-term incentives for 
investors and energy producers to build more renewable energy 
infrastructure.8  As a result, “shovel-ready” wind projects, like T. 
 
2 See Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  AARTA is also known as Division B of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which is commonly referred to as 
ARRA or “the Stimulus Bill.” 
3 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, ANOTHER RECORD YEAR FOR NEW WIND 
INSTALLATIONS 1 (2008), available at http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Market 
_Update.pdf. 
4 Clifford Krauss, Alternative Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2008, at B1. 
5 See id. 
6 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND ENERGY FOR A NEW ERA: AN AGENDA FOR THE 
NEW PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 2 (2008), available at http://newwindagenda.org/ 
documents/Wind_Agenda_Report.pdf. 
7 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 3, at 1. 
8 See Krauss, supra note 4. 
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Boone Pickens’ ambitious 8000-megawatt (MW) wind farm in Texas, 
are languishing and the industry is shedding jobs.9 
In December 2008, Congress attempted to thaw the credit markets 
and prop up faltering banks by approving an infusion of $700 billion 
into the economy through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (the Bailout Bill).10  While it is debatable whether this effort 
will pay off in the long term, it is certain that with nearly half of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) money spent11 there has been 
little improvement in the lending practices of the recipient banks.12  
Even if banks did turn the lending spigots back on, the wind industry 
would be an unlikely recipient of such loans as long as traditional 
energy prices remain low and banks continue to record losses, 
rendering new wind projects economically unviable. 
In the absence of legislative action, the industry would almost 
certainly be facing imminent collapse.  With the passage of ARRTA, 
wind energy producers have reason to breathe easier.  While ARRTA 
accomplishes a laundry list of wind industry requests,13 it only 
temporarily sweetens the pot of government incentives available to 
investors and developers, and ultimately it fails to address the long-
term problems caused by the fossil fuel market fluctuations that are at 
the heart of the crisis. 
This Note explores the weaknesses that the recession has exposed 
in the United States’ current renewable energy tax policy and 
evaluates the 111th Congress’ legislative response to those 
weaknesses.  In doing so, this Note looks at the major U.S. renewable 
energy tax policies of the last thirty years and investigates the effects 
 
9 Ryan Randazzo, Oil Billionaire Revises Plan to Reduce Foreign Oil Imports, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/business/articles/ 
2008/11/12/20081112biz-pickens1112.html. 
10 Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101, 115, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767, 3780 (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5211, 5225). 
11 See David Barstow & Mike McIntire, Calls for Clarity in New Bailout for U.S. 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at B1. 
12 Joe Nocera, First Bailout Formula Had It Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B1. 
13 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 
1101(a), § 45(d)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 319 (extending the Production Tax Credit for wind to 
December 31, 2012); id. sec. 1102(a), § 48(a)(5)(A)(ii), 123 Stat. at 319–20 (allowing a 
taxpayer to elect a thirty percent investment tax credit in lieu of the PTC); id. sec. 
1261(b)(1)(A)–(B), § 382, 123 Stat. at 342–43 (reversing I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 
I.R.B. 905); id. sec. 1603(a)–(b)(2)(A), § 48, 123 Stat. at 364–66 (allowing a taxpayer to 
elect a government grant in lieu of the PTC and the ITC in the amount of the thirty percent 
ITC created by section 1102 of ARRTA). 
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of those federal policies on the wind energy industry.  The focus on 
wind is not an endorsement to pursue wind energy over all other 
forms of renewable energy; rather, it is meant as a case study on how 
federal tax policy has effected one industry and how it can better 
encourage growth in that industry.14 
Part I outlines the current state of the wind energy industry, its 
potential to grow, and the difficulties presented by the financial crisis, 
the recession, and fluctuations in prices for traditional sources of 
energy.  Part II discusses the history, successes, and limitations of the 
federal renewable energy tax policies of the past thirty years, 
including a discussion of the Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the 
key renewable energy sections of ARRTA.  Part III suggests a 
comprehensive renewable energy policy that complements the 
significant accomplishments in ARRTA and clears the way for the 
wind industry to become a major player in the U.S. energy market. 
I 
THE BENEFITS, CHALLENGES, AND POTENTIAL OF THE U.S. WIND 
INDUSTRY 
From 2004 to 2008, the United States added record amounts of 
new wind energy capacity, putting it ahead of Germany as the world 
leader in wind energy.15  This successful expansion of the industry 
has been driven by high fossil fuel prices and congressional extension 
of the PTC, which has made wind energy more competitive with 
traditional sources of energy and has drawn financing to wind 
projects.16  U.S. wind energy capacity increased by fifty percent in 
2008 alone;17 however, it still only makes up 1.5 percent of the 
nation’s total electricity production.18  While it will never be able to 
fulfill all of the energy needs of the United States, wind energy could 
play a major role in the U.S. energy portfolio. 
 
14 Many of the principles discussed in this Note could also apply to other forms of 
renewable energy.  However, wind energy is unique in that it is closer than any other 
renewable energy technology to being competitive with traditional power plants. 
15 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, U.S. and China in Race to the Top of Global 
Wind Industry (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/us 
_and_china_race_to_top_of_wind_energy_02Fed09.html. 
16 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 3, at 1. 
17 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, supra note 15. 
18 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, U.S. WIND ENERGY INSTALLATIONS TOP 20,000 MW 2 
(2008), available at http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/20GW.pdf. 
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According to a study by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
wind could make up as much as twenty percent of the country’s 
energy portfolio.19  The DOE estimated it would take approximately 
twenty-three years to reach the twenty percent mark.20  Based on the 
gains of the last few years, the United States is already ahead of the 
DOE’s projections.21  The pursuit and accomplishment of twenty 
percent wind energy would yield huge environmental and economic 
benefits for the United States. 
A.  Environmental Benefits of Wind 
Wind energy is one of the cleanest ways to produce electricity.22  
The turbines on a wind machine have zero emissions,23 and the 
manufacturing, installation, and maintenance of the components of a 
wind machine have a relatively low environmental impact, making it 
a clean technology even when measured against other renewables.24 
When it comes to wind energy’s environmental superiority over 
fossil fuels, there simply is no comparison.  As of 2007, the United 
States derived 48.5% of its electricity from coal, 21.6% from natural 
gas, 19.4% from nuclear, 5.8% from hydroelectric, 1.6% from 
petroleum, and only 2.5% from renewable sources (around half of 
which is produced from wind).25  Deriving so much electricity from 
 
19 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND 
BY 2030, at 7 (2008), available at http://www.20percentwind.org/20percent_wind_energy 
_report_revOct08.pdf. 
20 Id. 
21 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 18, at 2 (announcing that in 2008 wind energy 
capacity in the United States had surpassed the 25,000 MW mark); ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
& RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 7 (showing a chart predicting that U.S. wind 
energy capacity would reach 25,000 MW between 2010 and 2012); MAUREEN HAND ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, POWER SYSTEM MODELING OF 20% WIND-GENERATED 
ELECTRICITY BY 2030, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.nrel 
.gov/docs/fy08osti/42794.pdf (“Providing 20% of projected U.S. electricity demand by 
2030 would require 305 [gigawatts] of wind technology producing 1200 [terawatt-hours] 
annually . . . .  Assuming wind turbine size increases from [the 2007] average of 1.6 MW 
to roughly 3 MW, this would result in around 100,000 wind turbines.”). 
22 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 105. 
23 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND ENERGY BASICS 4 (2009), available at http://www 
.awea.org/newsroom/pdf/Wind_Energy_Basics.pdf. 
24 Robert Monroe, Potent Greenhouse Gas More Prevalent in Atmosphere than 
Previously Assumed, U.C. SAN DIEGO NEWS CENTER (U.C. San Diego, San Diego, Cal.), 
Oct. 23, 2008, http://ucsdnews.ucsd.edu/newsrel/science/10-08GreenhouseGas.asp. 
25 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2007, at 
2–3 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. 
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burning fossil fuels creates six billion metric tons of carbon dioxide 
annually, among other harmful greenhouse gas emissions.26  In 2008, 
wind energy displaced the equivalent of 28.7 million tons of coal, 90 
million barrels of oil, or 530 billion cubic feet of natural gas and 
prevented up to 34 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from being 
emitted into the atmosphere.27 
If wind energy were to make up twenty percent of the U.S. energy 
supply, the United States could meet its energy needs while avoiding 
annual emissions of approximately 825 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide.28  According to the DOE projection, a cumulative 7.6 billion 
metric tons of carbon dioxide would be prevented over the twenty-
three year construction phase leading up to twenty percent wind.29 
B.   Economic Benefits of Wind 
1.  Jobs and Economic Activity 
Wind energy in the United States has the potential to be a major 
contributor to the nation’s energy portfolio and in doing so create 
hundreds of thousands of new jobs and billions of dollars of economic 
activity.30  Wind has proven to be successful in countries like 
Denmark, Spain, and Germany where wind energy makes up twenty-
one percent, twelve percent, and seven percent of annual electricity 
generation, respectively.31  In the European Union, the wind energy 
industry supports over 150,000 workers; that number is expected to 
more than double by 2020 as the EU works toward the goal of twenty 
percent renewable energy.32 
 
26 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 14. 
27 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 18, at 1. 
28 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 13. 
29 Id. at 14. 
30 See id. at 204–05. 
31 EUR. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND AT WORK: WIND ENERGY AND JOB CREATION IN 
THE EU 23 (2009), available at http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_documents/ 
documents/publications/Wind_at_work_FINAL.pdf. 
32 GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT 34, 58 (2008), 
available at http://www.gwec.net/fileadmin/documents/test2/gwec-08-update_FINAL.pdf.  
On a particularly blustery day in November 2008, Spain set the single day record for 
producing wind energy by deriving forty-three percent of the electricity used on that day 
from wind.  Posting of Matthew McDermott to TreeHugger, http://www.treehugger.com/ 
files/2008/11/spainish-wind-power-record-43-percent-electric-demand.php (Nov. 25, 
2008). 
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In 2008, wind energy created revenue of over $30 billion 
globally.33  In the United States, the wind industry channeled an 
investment of $17 billion into the economy and directly employed 
85,000 workers.34  These numbers were up from $3 billion in profits 
and 36,000 workers in 2006.35  Building more wind projects would 
provide a major boost to the U.S. manufacturing industry,36 which has 
lost over four million jobs over the last ten years.37  Consequently, 
there is a ready and capable workforce that has experience 
manufacturing similar products as well as empty factories that could 
easily be retrofitted to manufacture wind towers, turbines, and 
blades.38 
If wind energy was to make up twenty percent of the U.S. energy 
mix, the wind industry could support as many as 500,000 jobs39 and 
$27 billion in economic activity annually just from operating the wind 
turbines.40  Beyond the wealth created from producing and selling 
wind energy, the construction phase leading to twenty percent wind 
would produce approximately $944 billion in economic activity.41  
Finally, increased use of wind energy would alleviate the demand on 
fossil fuels, lowering the cost of fossil fuels and saving Americans 
$128 billion annually in electricity costs.42 
 
33 JOEL MAKOWER ET AL., CLEAN EDGE, CLEAN ENERGY TRENDS 2008, at 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.cleanedge.com/reports/pdf/Trends2008.pdf. 
34 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy Grows by Record 8300 MW 
in 2008 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/wind 
_energy_growth2008_27Jan09.html. 
35 ROGER BEZDEK, AM. SOLAR ENERGY SOC’Y, RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY: ECONOMIC DRIVERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (2007), available at http:// 
www.ases.org/images/stories/ASES-JobsReport-Final.pdf. 
36 MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. METRO 
ECONOMIES: CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GREEN JOBS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 13 (2008), 
available at http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/GreenJobsReport.pdf. 
37 Stephen Manning, Profiting from Upscale Goods: U.S. Still Leads World in Higher-
End Manufacturing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Feb. 21, 2009, available at http://www 
.dispatch.com/live/content/business/stories/2009/02/21/make_nothing_nation.ART_ART 
_02-21-09_C8_UQD01UT.html?sid=101. 
38 MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., supra note 36, at 13. 
39 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 209. 
40 Id. at 205. 
41 Id. at 204. 
42 HAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 5. 
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2.  Competitiveness with Traditional Power Plants 
The technology for converting wind into electricity has existed for 
over one hundred years, but it was not until the past three decades that 
advancements in technology have allowed it to be viable on a 
commercial scale.43  With technological advances lowering the price 
of installation and improving the efficiency of wind machines, wind 
energy is currently the closest of all renewables to being cost 
competitive with traditional sources of electricity.44 
When considering the price of producing wind energy compared 
with producing energy with coal, natural gas, or nuclear power three 
economic factors should be considered: (1) the cost per MW of 
building new capacity, (2) the cost per MW of the fuel used to 
produce electricity, and (3) the cost per MW of operations and 
maintenance of the energy facilities.45  By considering these expenses 
in terms of how much they would cost per MW of new capacity, a 
direct comparison between energy sources is possible.46  As with most 
renewables, the biggest cost per MW of wind energy installed is the 
initial investment in building and connecting new capacity to the grid 
because, once established, a wind farm has few maintenance costs and 
absolutely no fuel costs.47 
The inverse is true for coal and natural gas.  The price tag for 
building a new coal- or natural-gas-fired power plant is relatively low 
compared to the amount of MWs of capacity that power plant adds to 
the grid; however, maintenance and operational costs for a fossil-fuel-
based power plant are slightly more expensive per MW than wind.48  
Finally, the biggest cost per MW of energy production for coal- and 
 
43 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 28. 
44 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Solar Power, http://www.nrdc.org/air/ 
energy/renewables/solar.asp (last visited May 5, 2009); Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Wind Power, http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/renewables/wind.asp (last visited 
May 5, 2009). 
45 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2006 (2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo06/special_topics.html; 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004, at 195 (2004), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2004/weo2004.pdf. 
46 For instance, if it costs $100 million to install, operate, and maintain a 100 MW wind 
farm for ten years and $150 million to produce the same amount of electricity over that 
period at a natural-gas-fired power plant, it would be more economical to install the wind 
farm than operate the natural-gas-fired plant. 
47 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 45, at 195. 
48 Id. 
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natural-gas-fired power plants is the purchase of the fuel that the plant 
burns to create electricity.49 
Nuclear, while much more expensive in terms of the overall cost of 
building the power plant, is much closer to wind in how the costs of 
building new capacity are broken down per MW.50  A nuclear plant 
produces much more electricity than a new wind energy installation, 
so building a new nuclear plant actually costs a little less than wind in 
terms of the cost of each MW of electricity produced.51  But overall, 
developing and operating new wind capacity is less expensive than 
developing and operating new nuclear capacity52 because nuclear is 
much more expensive to operate and has higher fuel costs than 
wind.53  
Eventually wind energy will be cheaper to produce, even 
considering startup costs, than any traditional source of energy 
because the fuels that traditional power plants rely on will continue to 
increase in price, while wind energy will continue to become more 
efficient and cheaper to produce.  However, in the short term, as long 
as wind’s competitiveness with coal and natural gas is subject to 
drastic swings in the cost of fuel, the industry will not be able to 
sustain the growth that is necessary to stabilize energy prices and 
wean the United States from these carbon-emitting energy sources.  In 
order to build the wind industry, government will have to insulate it 
from the market influences created by volatile fossil fuel prices. 
C.  Challenges for the Wind Energy Industry 
1.  Efficiency, Grid Access, and Intermittency 
Wind energy technology is mature and ready for mass production; 
however, there are challenges and drawbacks facing the industry 
which, if overcome, would make it an even more attractive alternative 
to traditional energy sources. 
First, as mentioned above, improvements in wind machine 
efficiency would vastly increase the viability of the industry and the 
practicality of a major investment in wind energy.  In addition, 
technological improvements in the efficiency of the electrical grid and 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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expansion of energy storage options would allow more of the wind 
energy that is produced to be used.  While significant amounts of 
wind energy can be plugged into the current electrical grid,54 access to 
the grid at many of the best potential wind energy producing sites is 
limited.55  Wind farms are often sited in rural areas far from the 
largest electricity users and traditional power plants.56  This poses two 
problems: (1) when siting a wind farm, a developer faces the 
additional hurdle of connecting it to the grid;57 and (2) as a result of 
the electrical current traveling longer distances to reach energy users, 
wind energy experiences increased “line loss” during transmission.58 
Finally, wind machines only produce electricity when the wind is 
blowing.  The intermittency of wind energy poses a problem because 
utilities cannot count on an exact amount of energy production.59  
Another issue is that the timing of production of wind energy cannot 
be controlled by utilities in order to maximize power production 
during peak usage.60  There are currently no practical ways to store 
the energy produced, but not used, during times of high production 
and low energy usage.61  Research and development into storage 
options would greatly improve the usefulness of wind energy. 
2. Environmental Concerns and Local Opposition 
Despite the value that wind farms bring to rural communities—
jobs, property taxes, cheap power—wind farm developers often 
experience opposition from communities near proposed wind farm 
sites.62  This opposition stems from various concerns, such as 
degradation of local stakeholders’ views,63 impact on migrating 
birds,64 and suspicion over potential adverse health effects caused by 
 
54 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 77. 
55 See id. at 95. 
56 See id. at 116. 
57 Matthew L. Wald, Hurdles (Not Financial Ones) Await Electric Grid Update, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at A11. 
58 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 93–94. 
59 Id. at 75. 
60 See Mark Svenvold, Wind-Power Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, § MM 
(Magazine), at 77. 
61 See Ken Belson, Air Storage Is Explored for Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008, at 
B1. 
62 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 105. 
63 Id. at 106. 
64 Id. 
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wind machines.65  The “not in my backyard” effect should be taken 
seriously because, if not handled with care, local government could 
prevent a wind farm from being built by denying permits at the local 
level.66 
Wind farm developers should take care to limit the amount of 
perceived damage to local communities.  If the developer does so, the 
preceding arguments should not be very persuasive.  For instance, 
windmills are responsible for far fewer bird deaths annually than 
domestic cats or buildings.67  Additionally, if wind energy helps us to 
avoid some of the most damaging effects of global warming, it would 
in turn likely save the lives of more birds and other animals than 
would be killed by wind farms.68  As for visual concerns, most people 
would agree that a row of wind machines is far more attractive than 
the smoke stacks of a coal-fired power plant and the smog created by 
generating fossil-fuel-based power. 
II 
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY PAST AND PRESENT 
Growth and profitability in the wind energy industry is impacted 
by a set of internal and external factors.  The major internal factor is 
the cost of installing new wind energy, determined by the interplay of 
the cost of manufacturing and constructing wind machines and the 
amount of energy those machines are capable of producing.  As 
mentioned above, the initial investment costs in a wind project are the 
biggest expense in producing wind energy.  Increases in U.S. wind 
manufacturing capacity and innovations in design, materials, and 
turbine efficiency will help bring those costs down by producing more 
energy per dollar invested.  In turn, the price of wind energy will 
come down and become more competitive with traditional sources of 
electricity.  These internal factors are mostly under the control of the 
industry but can be helped along with government investment in 
research and development. 
The external factors impacting the industry are mostly outside the 
control of the industry and need government incentives and support to 
overcome.  The most serious external factors that currently determine 
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whether it is financially wise to invest in wind energy are: (1) the 
price of fuel for traditional power plants; (2) the availability and 
desirability of tax incentives and other government support for 
investing in wind; and (3) the regulatory and technological hurdles, 
such as the FERC approval process, local political pressures, grid 
access, and availability of long-term wind studies of the proposed site. 
All of these factors impact the most critical factor of all, access to 
capital to build new wind projects.  The price of fuel for traditional 
power plants has fluctuated dramatically since the 1970s.69  When 
fossil fuel prices are up, wind is able to compete, but when fossil fuel 
prices are down, it cannot.  As mentioned above, new wind capacity 
is capital intensive and requires a significant portion of that money up 
front.  When wind is competitive, capital is more plentiful and 
cheaper to obtain.  But when new wind capacity is more expensive to 
build than a new fossil-fuel-fired power plant, it is difficult to find 
financing and wind projects are not built.  Government can better 
control these external factors than the industry.  It is important that 
the government tips the scale to allow the wind industry to avoid the 
starts and stops caused by volatility of fossil fuel prices so that the 
industry has a chance to succeed before the country encounters its 
next crisis. 
A.  Renewable Energy Tax Policy 1978 to 1992 
In order to find a solution to propel the industry through the 
recession, it is important to analyze the successes and shortcomings of 
the last thirty years of federal renewable energy policies.  The energy 
crises of the 1970s, the mix of tax and energy policies that followed, 
and the rise and fall of the California wind industry in the early 1980s 
provide an excellent example of how government support, financial 
woes, and volatile prices for traditional energy impact the renewable 
energy industry. 
The debate over renewable energy first became a part of the 
national political discussion after the OPEC Embargo of 1973 and the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 showed Americans the vulnerability 
created by reliance on foreign oil for much of their energy needs.70  
This new awareness, coupled with the spike in fossil fuel prices and 
the economic turmoil that followed, sparked the federal government 
 
69 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2007, at 
194–97, 216–17 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf. 
70 ROBERT W. RIGHTER, WIND ENERGY IN AMERICA 294 (1996). 
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to deploy tax incentives and open up energy markets dominated by 
utilities to encourage investment in renewable energy production.71  It 
also prompted state governments to take action, most notably in 
California.72  Investors and businesses took advantage of the federal 
and state incentives in California, which produced a short-lived boom 
of newly installed wind energy capacity from 1981 to 1985.73  In 
many ways, the federal and state policies were not well conceived 
which led to abuses and the eventual expiration of the incentives. 
1.  The National Energy Act of 1978 
In the late 1970s, consumers were suffering from high fuel costs, 
and experts were predicting that prices would not let up in the 
foreseeable future.  The new national focus on energy policy led 
Congress to pass the National Energy Act of 1978 (NEA).74  The 
NEA contained two important pieces of legislation that greatly 
affected the rise of the California wind industry in the 1980s: the 
Energy Tax Act of 1978 (ETA),75 which provided tax incentives for 
new investment in renewable energy technology, and the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),76 which created a 
guaranteed market and price structure for nonutility producers of 
renewable energy.77 
The ETA greatly reduced subsidies and tax deductions that favored 
the production of oil and gas and introduced a windfall profits tax for 
oil companies that had benefited from rising oil prices.78  At the same 
time the ETA used tax policy to discourage energy production by 
traditional sources of energy, it added tax incentives for investment in 
renewable energy producing facilities.79  The business investment tax 
credit (ITC), originally enacted in 1962, allowed businesses to deduct 
 
71 See id. at 197–98. 
72 Id. at 295. 
73 Id. 
74 Pub. L. Nos. 95-617 to 95-621, 92 Stat. 3117–3411 (codified as amended in scattered 
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HANDBOOK OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 671 (Frank Kreith & Ronald E. West eds., 1997). 
75 Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
76 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645). 
77 PAUL GIPE, WIND ENERGY COMES OF AGE 30–31 (1995). 
78 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., ENERGY TAX POLICY, at CRS-4 
(2004), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/IB10054_20040220.pdf. 
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a credit of ten percent of the amount of new investment against their 
tax liability.80  While any business was eligible to claim the ITC, the 
ETA made investment in certain categories of renewable and 
nontraditional energy producing facilities, including wind, eligible for 
an additional ten percent business ITC.81 
A credit on an investment effectively lowers the price of 
purchasing an asset and increases the rate of return to the investor 
when that asset begins to produce income.82  For instance, assuming a 
thirty-four percent corporate tax rate, a ten percent credit would 
increase the rate of return over ten years by twelve percent.83  This 
favorable tax treatment is roughly equivalent to lowering that 
business’s tax rate—as to the income created by that item—by fifteen 
percent.84  The ETA provided renewable energy companies with an 
even more attractive deal by offering a combined twenty percent tax 
credit for new investments in renewable energy technology, which 
considerably reduced start-up costs. 
The other important piece of legislation for renewable energy 
companies that was passed as part of the NEA was PURPA, which 
guaranteed independent producers a market and a “fair” price for the 
power they produced.  Before PURPA, electric utilities had a 
monopoly on the production and transmission of electricity in the 
United States.85  Congress understood that encouraging businesses to 
invest in renewable energy producing facilities would not be effective 
if utilities proved unwilling to allow these new energy producers to 
hook up to the grid or refused to purchase the power at a fair price.86  
Therefore, PURPA required utilities to purchase all of the power 
generated by independently owned renewable energy plants and 
required them to pay a price equal to the utility’s avoided cost—the 
cost the utility would have had to expend to meet the same energy 
need.87 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the federal 
agency that regulates interstate transmission of electricity in the 
 
80 JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 160 (5th ed. 1987). 
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85 RIGHTER, supra note 70, at 199. 
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United States.88  When PURPA became law, utilities sought FERC’s 
guidance on what the law required of them.89  FERC confirmed that 
PURPA required utilities to purchase all of the power independent 
producers generated.90  However, FERC interpreted avoided cost as 
strictly reflecting the financial costs avoided by the utility.91  The 
actual determination of avoided costs was left up to the states.92  A 
major factor in determining avoided costs was the current and 
projected price for the fuels on which the utility typically relied to 
produce electricity.93  It also included any construction or 
maintenance costs the utility would have to incur in order to produce 
the electricity itself.94  This interpretation of “avoided cost” 
guaranteed that new wind energy would only be installed when fossil 
fuel prices were high enough that it would not be economically wise 
to build new coal- or natural-gas-fired power plants.  Even worse, 
FERC’s interpretation emphasized economics over the health and 
environmental benefits of wind energy generation. 
2. Additional State-Level Tax Incentives in California During the 
1980s 
In addition to the federal business and renewable ITCs, California 
offered up to an additional twenty-five percent state ITC for 
investment in new renewable energy facilities as well as a property 
tax exemption for property containing renewable energy generating 
facilities.95  Altogether, the mix of federal and state tax incentives 
totaled a tax write-off of nearly fifty percent of the installation costs 
for new wind projects.96 
In addition to these generous tax incentives, California took an 
aggressive approach in interpreting the cost-avoided rate per kilowatt-
hour.97  The rate established by the California Energy Commission 
 
88 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, What FERC Does, http://www.ferc.gov/ 
about/ferc-does.asp (last visited May 5, 2009). 
89 See FERC Regulations Under Sections 201 and 210 of the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101(b)(6), 292.302(b)–(e) (2008). 
90 Id. § 202.303. 
91 Id. § 202.304(b). 
92 Id. § 202.304(b)(3). 
93 Id. § 202.304(e). 
94 Id. § 202.304(b). 
95 RIGHTER, supra note 70, at 197. 
96 GIPE, supra note 77, at 31. 
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(CEC) was three to seven times higher than that of most other states.98  
As a result of California’s favorable avoided cost and state-level tax 
incentives, renewable energy producers in California were guaranteed 
higher returns on energy they produced and were eligible for larger 
tax credits for the initial investment in the facilities than in any other 
state. 
3.  The California Wind Boom 
Despite all of the incentives available in 1978, there was little 
effect on investments in new renewable energy production in 
California until after FERC and CEC had weighed in on avoided 
costs.99  Without a guaranteed market and price, the investment in the 
young technology was too risky.100  After FERC left avoided cost up 
to the states and CEC provided its favorable ruling, California was 
ripe for expansive investment in wind energy. 
In the early 1980s, with ETA and PURPA in place, California was 
the state with the most generous tax incentives, the most generous 
interpretation of avoided costs, and the most aggressive regulatory 
agency.101  In addition, CEC had already gathered much of the 
necessary data to aid investors in siting wind farms.  The agency 
produced wind energy reports, which measured wind capacity in 
different areas of California, and provided them to potential 
investors.102  These studies showed that California had great capacity 
for wind energy, and that if fully utilized, the state could produce 
twenty-five percent of the entire nation’s energy through wind-
generated electricity.103 
This mix of favorable tax treatment and a guaranteed market and 
prices fueled a boom in the wind energy industry in California during 
the early 1980s.104  The first wind farm was installed in 1981; by the 
end of the wind boom, California had installed 1304 MW of new 
generating capacity, representing ninety percent of installed wind 
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energy capacity worldwide.105  However, to put it in perspective, wind 
power still only represented a tiny fraction of one percent of the 
country’s electricity supply106 and only about two percent of 
California’s electricity supply in 1987.107  Even though it was a small 
achievement in terms of energy produced, the tax incentives were 
successful in creating a new industry almost overnight.108 
4.  Shortcomings of the Wind Boom 
There were many problems with the wind boom and the policies 
that initiated it.  First, large-scale wind technology was relatively new 
and untested.  There were many different experimental wind 
machines that were sited during this time, some of which turned out 
to be inefficient or completely unworkable.109  The technological 
difficulties were further exacerbated because the tax incentives drew 
investors that were more knowledgeable about brokering deals than 
siting wind machines.110  In fact, the industry’s growing pains might 
have been less pronounced if the tax incentives had been less 
generous or tied to results and there had been more oversight and 
technical assistance from the CEC.  Since the tax incentives were so 
favorable in California in the 1980s, many projects were built 
primarily for the tax credits and without concern for how successful 
the project would be.111 
Another problem that helped to cut short the wind boom was the 
fact that PURPA’s avoided costs were tied to traditional fuel costs, 
and there was a precipitous drop in the cost of traditional energy 
sources in the mid-to-late 1980s.112  The favorable rates that CEC 
required of utilities while the first renewable energy producers were 
ramping up were based on a bleak outlook for traditional energy 
resources, which allowed independent energy producers to receive a 
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high contract price for the renewable energy they produced.113  When 
prices for traditional energy dropped steadily in the mid-to-late 1980s, 
the new avoided cost calculations were much lower and many 
independent energy producers found that their businesses were no 
longer profitable.114 
5. The Free Market Approach 1986 to 1992 
The mid-1980s were a political and economic perfect storm that 
froze investment in new wind capacity.  President Ronald Reagan 
deplored government intervention into the energy markets and 
predicted that if energy prices remained high, the private sector would 
invest in renewable energy technology on its own.115  This faith in the 
free market and the public outcry over abusive tax shelters, led 
Congress to allow the general business ITC and renewable energy 
ITC to expire in 1985.116  Similarly, the California legislature allowed 
the state-level ITC to expire in 1986.117 
Unfortunately, Reagan’s prediction turned out not to be true.  Just 
as wind energy contracts were ending and being renegotiated, fossil 
fuel prices dropped precipitously, creating a poor economic climate 
for current and potential new wind energy producers.118  With low 
coal and natural gas prices, it became much cheaper for utilities to 
produce electricity using traditional sources of energy; therefore, their 
avoided costs when independent producers provided them with 
renewable energy were much lower.119  With the ETA and general 
business ITCs gone, low fossil fuel prices driving down the avoided 
costs under PURPA to a point of practically guaranteeing losses, and 
the spigot of new capital turned off by tax reform, the wind industry 
was at a standstill. 
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6.  Analysis of First-Generation Renewable Energy Tax Incentives 
Policymakers in the late 1970s and early 1980s provided a mix of 
tax credits tied to investment, regulatory protection for renewable 
projects, price controls, and market guarantees.  This policy mix 
encouraged a flurry of investment in wind energy in California, but its 
success was marred by inefficiencies that could have been curbed 
with more careful policy planning. 
Because the combination of state and federal tax credits were so 
generous and were tied to investment but not results, they encouraged 
abusive tax planning rather than wise business planning.  The abuse 
of tax credits might have been limited if the government had created 
standards and required oversight of wind projects in order to qualify 
for the credits.  PURPA, in combination with high fossil fuel prices, 
created a temporary market for wind energy, but it failed to sustain 
that market when traditional energy costs were low.  Government tax 
incentives dried up before the industry had evolved to a point where it 
was profitable without government support, cutting off the flow of 
investors. 
Initially, investors were hesitant to start taking advantage of the tax 
credits, likely due to the uncertainty surrounding the commercial 
viability of wind technology and the open questions regarding the 
interpretation of PURPA.  Once FERC ruled on the legal aspects, the 
planning and construction phases of commercial-scale wind projects 
created an additional delay to the electricity coming online.  Although 
the tax credits expired in the mid-1980s, PURPA remains in effect 
today.  However, it was amended in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to 
the disfavor of independent producers of renewable energy.120  
Congress lifted the requirement to purchase energy produced by 
qualified facilities in what FERC determines to be a “competitive 
wholesale market” where the facility would have nondiscriminatory 
access to sell the electricity it produces.121  This change was 
especially significant given the timing and market conditions.  The 
amendment was passed amidst rising fossil fuel prices when the 
utilities’ avoided costs would be at their highest and therefore most 
beneficial to independent renewable energy producers. 
 
120 Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1253(a), § 824a-3(m)(1)(B), 119 Stat. 594, 967–68. 
121 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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B.  Renewable Energy Tax Policy 1992 to Present 
In the early 1980s, the renewable energy ITC proved that with high 
fossil fuel prices and a growing economy, tax incentives could 
encourage investment in wind energy.  Between 1986 and 1992, a 
time of low fossil fuel prices (except for a brief increase during the 
Persian Gulf War), a slumping economy, and no tax incentives for 
renewable energy, the industry failed to produce much new wind 
energy capacity.122  Since 1992, the federal government’s primary 
source of support for renewable energy has come in the form of the 
Production Tax Credit (PTC).123  When combined with advances in 
wind energy technology, the PTC has been successful at creating 
sustained growth in the industry during times of rising fossil fuel 
prices and economic stability.  However, the PTC is ill equipped to 
sustain growth when fossil fuel is cheap and the economy is in 
recession. 
1.  The Production Tax Credit 
The PTC, which was created by the Energy Policy Act of 1992,124 
offers taxpayers a credit of 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity 
(adjusted for inflation)125 (1) “produced by the taxpayer,” (2) “from 
qualified energy resources,” (3) “at a qualified facility,” (4) “during 
the 10-year period beginning on the date the facility was originally 
placed in service,” and (5) “sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated 
person during the taxable year.”126  Congress drafted the PTC with the 
tax credit abuses of the wind boom in mind and designed it to avoid 
the frivolous tax shelters that many wind farms became during that 
period.  Congress changed the nature and incentive structure of the 
old renewable energy tax incentives by imposing several limitations 
on taxpayer’s eligibility for the PTC and most importantly by 
requiring renewable energy facilities to produce electricity over an 
extended period of time in order to receive the full benefit of the 
credit.  The subparts below describe the elements of the PTC and their 
importance with regard to wind energy projects. 
 
122 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 6. 
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124 Pub. L. No. 102-486, sec. 1914, §§ 38, 39, 45, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020–23. 
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a.  Qualified Energy Sources 
Originally, the PTC only applied to wind and closed-loop biomass 
energy facilities,127 but Congress has added new qualifying energy 
sources over the years.  Today, the PTC is available for renewable 
energy facilities that produce electricity from wind, biomass, 
geothermal, solar, small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, 
qualified hydropower production, and marine and hydrokinetic 
renewable energy.128 
b.  Production and Sale Requirements 
Instead of tying the tax credits to the cost of the initial investment 
in renewable energy, Congress made receipt of tax credits dependent 
upon the production and sale of electricity from renewable projects.129  
In order to determine the amount of tax credit the taxpayer is eligible 
to receive, he must multiply the inflation-adjusted PTC rate by the 
amount of energy, measured in kilowatt-hours, produced at the 
qualifying facility and sold to an unrelated party during the tax 
year.130  This means that electricity produced but not sold—such as 
when a wind energy facility produces electricity that is not needed to 
fulfill demand and is therefore not sold to a utility to be distributed—
does not count as energy produced for the purposes of calculating the 
PTC.  Additionally, only sales to “unrelated persons” are eligible for 
the PTC.131  Section 45(e)(4) defines “related persons” as “persons 
[that] would be treated as a single employer under the regulations 
prescribed under section 52(b),”132 which include employees of 
business entities that are held under common control.133 
The production and sale requirements encourage investment in 
successful wind projects because a wind farm that is inefficient or 
nonfunctional creates little or no tax benefit to the taxpayer.  
Additionally, the PTC spreads the tax credits out over a ten-year 
period.134  This delay encourages investors to build lasting wind farms 
that will continue generating electricity for at least ten years, but it 
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also creates some risk for investors counting on deriving the full 
benefit of the PTC over the entire eligibility period.  The PTC is 
contingent on continued operation of the facilities and the actual 
production levels of the facilities.  Because wind energy output varies 
significantly, it is difficult to project anticipated production over ten 
years and therefore hard to calculate the anticipated value of the PTC. 
c.  Sunset Clause and Placed-in-Service Limitation 
Congress built a sunset clause135 into the PTC to keep it from 
becoming an entrenched, permanent subsidy.  Originally, Congress 
limited the facilities that would qualify to those placed in service for 
the first time after December 31, 1993, but before July 1, 1999.136  In 
order to ensure the continued availability of the PTC, Congress has 
extended the sunset date through legislation, typically for only one or 
two years at a time.137  Between 1999 and 2004, Congress allowed the 
PTC to lapse three times by failing to extend the eligibility window 
before the scheduled sunset date.138  Since 2004, the PTC has enjoyed 
a streak of continuous extensions,139 including a one-year extension 
passed as a rider to the Bailout Bill.140  Finally, thanks to a provision 
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in ARRTA, the eligibility window for the PTC currently extends 
through December 31, 2012.141 
Congress also made the PTC available only to newly built facilities 
that began producing electricity during the period that the PTC was in 
place.142  This “placed in service” limitation was intended to make the 
PTC an incentive to produce new electricity from newly constructed 
renewable energy facilities.  The IRS has ruled that retrofits to wind 
facilities that make up eighty percent or more of the fair market value 
of the upgraded facility may fulfill the placed-in-service requirement 
and qualify for the PTC.143  However, this limited interpretation of 
“placed in service” means that many old facilities that are lying 
dormant or using outdated technologies are ineligible for the PTC.  
These types of facilities could easily be retrofitted with new 
technology and begin producing energy to their maximum potential.  
In order to do so, a wind energy producer would need to secure 
financing, which would be much easier to obtain if he was able to 
offer the benefit of the PTC in return. 
Finally, the placed-in-service limitation, in combination with the 
PTC’s sunset clause, creates risk and uncertainty for investors that are 
considering starting a project near the sunset date.  If they were 
unable to complete the project before the sunset date and the PTC was 
allowed to lapse, they would be ineligible for the tax credit.  As 
discussed below, this was a major problem after 2000.  
d.  Qualified Facilities 
Section 45 does not define the term “qualified facility” beyond 
stating that it must be a facility that produces electricity from a 
qualified energy source, that is owned by the taxpayer, and that is 
originally placed in service during the period that the PTC is 
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available.144  The IRS issued a revenue ruling in 1994 stating that for 
wind energy “[e]ach wind turbine together with its tower and 
supporting pad . . . is a separate qualified facility.”145  Since each 
wind machine is a separate qualified facility, the PTC is separately 
calculated for each.   
e.  Eligible Taxpayers 
Only a taxpayer that produces electricity is eligible to receive the 
PTC.146  In order to be considered a producer under section 45, a 
taxpayer must have an ownership interest in the qualifying facility.147  
This poses a problem for wind energy developers because it can take 
several years before a wind farm is profitable.  Unless the developer 
has other businesses producing sufficient income to use the PTC, it 
provides little or no benefit to the developer during the first few years 
of the new wind project.  This financial reality has led to complex 
partnership agreements that allow the developer to monetize the PTC 
or effectively sell the tax benefit to an investor.148  By joining the 
developer in a partnership that owns the wind project, the investor 
gains an ownership interest in the qualifying facilities and earns the 
right to be eligible to receive the benefits of the PTC.  Section 45 
directs a partnership to allocate the total amount of energy production, 
and therefore the amount of the PTC, among the owners in proportion 
to their ownership interests in the gross sales of the partnership.149  
This means that the developer and investor can direct the bulk of the 
PTC to the investor by structuring the financing arrangement in the 
form of a partnership and allocating the investor a large percentage of 
the partnership.  The IRS has blessed this type of arrangement for 
financing wind projects by creating a safe harbor when such a 
partnership is created, but only if the partnership agreement follows 
very specific criteria.150  One downside of this arrangement is that the 
passive activity rules apply, which effectively limits potential 
 
144 I.R.C. § 45(a)(2). 
145 Rev. Rul. 94-31, 1994-1 C.B. 16. 
146 I.R.C. § 45(a)(2)(A). 
147 See id. § 45(e)(3). 
148 Adam C. Kobos et al., Stoel Rives LLP, Tax Issues, in THE LAW OF WIND 8-2 to 8-3 
(4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/WindTaxIssues 
_FFEC490A94773.pdf. 
149 I.R.C. § 45(e)(3). 
150 Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967. 
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investors to the large corporate entities that are not subject to the 
passive income restrictions in section 469 of the Code.151 
f.  Double-Dipping Limitation 
In another attempt to curb the tax shelter abuses during the wind 
boom, Congress required the PTC benefit to be reduced when a 
producer received certain types of state-level incentives, such as 
grants, tax-exempt bonds, and subsidized energy financing in addition 
to the PTC.152  These limits prevented companies from double dipping 
in federal and state incentives as they did in the 1980s, but it also has 
taken away some important tools that allow state and local 
governments to compete for renewable energy businesses.  However, 
the IRS specifically held that the PTC is not reduced based on the 
availability of state or local tax credits.153 
2.  The PTC’s Impact on the Wind Industry 
Since the PTC became effective in 1993, U.S. installed-wind 
capacity has increased from around 2000 MW154 to over 25,000 
MW.155  This growth can largely be attributed to the incentive created 
by the PTC.  But as discussed below, it would not have been as 
effective if not for the right mix of innovation and economic factors. 
Creation of new wind energy capacity under the PTC got off to a 
slow start, producing very little new wind energy capacity before the 
PTC’s first expiration in June 1999.156  Between 1999 and 2004, the 
industry went through a series of starts and stops as the PTC was 
allowed to expire three times.157  During that period, the addition of 
new capacity was likely half of what it could have been, settling at an 
overall capacity of around 6000 MW.158  Between 2004 and 2007, 
total installed wind generating capacity rose to approximately 17,000 
 
151 See I.R.C. § 469(a) (2006); Press Release, Stoel Rives LLP, Renewable Energy Law 
Alert: House Bill Proposes Increased Incentives for Renewable Energy Projects (Jan. 22, 
2009), http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show=3486. 
152 RYAN WISER ET AL., BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., ANALYZING THE INTERACTION 
BETWEEN STATE TAX INCENTIVES AND THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT FOR 
WIND POWER 4 (2002), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/reports/51465.pdf. 
153 Rev. Rul. 2006-9, 2006-1 C.B. 519. 
154 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 5. 
155 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n., supra note 34. 
156 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 6. 
157 Id. 
158 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 3, at 1. 
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MW.159  Capacity increased by nearly fifty percent in 2008, breaking 
the 25,000 MW mark and powering the equivalent of almost seven 
million homes.160  While this achievement is significant and is the 
most installed capacity in any country,161 wind energy still only 
makes up 1.5 percent of the U.S. electricity supply.162 
The PTC’s effectiveness is best analyzed by comparing the amount 
of new capacity brought online during two periods: the years where 
the tax credit was continuously in effect and the years when the PTC 
was allowed to expire.  However, the picture would be incomplete 
without looking at the other internal and external factors that 
contributed to those successes and failures.  In general, during the 
years that the PTC was available, more new wind energy capacity was 
added to the U.S. electrical grid than during the years it was not.163  
This difference is clear from the sharp declines in new capacity that 
occurred in the years following expiration of the PTC: 2000 (ninety-
three percent drop from 1999), 2002 (seventy-three percent drop from 
2001), and 2004 (seventy-seven percent drop from 2003).164  In 
comparison, during times when the PTC was continuously available, 
there was continuous growth in the annual total installed capacity.165 
While it is clear that having the PTC is better than not having the 
PTC in terms of encouraging investment in new wind capacity, the 
analysis is a little more complicated when comparing the two periods 
of unbroken PTC availability.  From 1992 through 1999, very little 
new capacity was added; however, from 2004 through 2008, record 
amounts of new capacity were installed every year.166  The contrast is 
stark and determining the differences that led to slight growth in one 
period and record growth in the other is at the heart of determining 
what policy changes would better encourage the latter. 
With respect to wind energy, the only major difference between the 
present day PTC and the PTC of the 1990s is its duration.  In the 
 
159 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Installed U.S. Wind Power Capacity 
Surged 45% in 2007 (Jan. 17, 2008), available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/ 
releases/AWEA_Market_Release_Q4_011708.html. 
160 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n., supra note 34. 
161 Id. 
162 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 3, at 1. 
163 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 138, at 1. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 6, at 8. 
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1990s, the PTC was available for six years without the need of an 
extension by Congress.  After 2004, the PTC was extended for short 
one- to two-year periods.  Taken with the fact that most of the growth 
in the 1990s took place right before the first expiration of the PTC, it 
would seem that the threat of expiration could have prompted a 
sudden flurry of economic activity in the 1990s.  Similarly, the 
successes after 2004 could be attributed to the fact that the industry 
was constantly working under the threat that the PTC could expire.  
However, these conclusions are misleading and ignore the bigger 
economic picture. 
The duration of the credit was not the only factor, let alone the 
most important factor, that effected the results in these two time 
periods.  In fact, rather than spurring on the industry with short 
extensions, it is likely that the short extensions have served as a 
disincentive for starting new projects.  When a sunset date is near, a 
company would be better off waiting until an extension is passed 
before sinking money into a new project. 
Another factor that likely contributed to the PTC’s slow start was 
that developers needed to gauge the usefulness of the credits, put 
together financing, select sites, and build projects.  Under ETA and 
PURPA in the 1970s and 1980s, any major installation of new 
capacity was delayed for approximately four years; the PTC took 
approximately five years to produce a significant amount of new 
capacity.  A delay in response to new legislation seems typical in the 
wind industry and could explain why there was more growth in the 
period between 2004 and 2008 than in the 1990s. 
There was also a host of economic factors that were more favorable 
to wind energy after 2004.  First, wind machine technology had vastly 
improved.  Compared to the machines that were being installed in the 
1980s, the machines in 1998 had an average capacity that was seven 
to ten times higher, which made wind energy prices nearly eighty 
percent lower than in the 1980s.167  Technology continued to improve 
over the next decade.  The average wind machine’s capacity rose 
from 0.5 MW in the mid-1990s168 to 1.6 MW in 2006,169 with the 
largest machines in production having a capacity of around 7.0 
 
167 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 6. 
168 GIPE, supra note 77, at 155. 
169 HAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 2; see also ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 19, at 28. 
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MW.170  These technological improvements helped to make wind 
much more competitive with traditional power plants and therefore a 
smarter investment. 
Another factor that created a better atmosphere for investing in 
wind energy between 2004 and 2008 was that fossil fuel prices were 
higher during that period, especially when compared to prices during 
the 1990s.171  Consequently, despite rapid economic growth in the 
1990s, few investors took advantage of the PTC.172  It was not until 
energy prices began rising again in 1999 and 2000—including a spike 
in natural gas prices and a doubling of oil prices—that there was a 
corresponding increase in new wind capacity.173  After a major spike 
in the wake of September 11, 2001, energy prices continued to rise, 
reaching a record high peak during the third quarter of 2008.174  In 
2004, traditional energy prices were high enough and wind energy 
prices were low enough that wind was suddenly competitive.175  In 
July of 2008, oil prices peaked at their highest level in history, $147 
per barrel.176  At the same time the country was experiencing record 
prices for traditional energy, the wind industry was churning out 
record amounts of new capacity; between 2007 and 2009, the nation’s 
cumulative wind capacity doubled. 
While the wisdom of short extensions of the PTC is doubtful, there 
is no denying that the PTC is capable of spurring economic growth in 
the wind industry when it is either able to make up the difference 
between traditional energy prices and wind energy prices—as it did 
between 2001 and 2004—or when traditional energy prices are 
roughly even or higher than wind energy prices—as they were 
between 2004 and 2008. 
 
170 Posting of Justin Thomas to MetaEfficient, http://www.metaefficient.com/news/ 
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172 ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 19, at 6. 
173 Paul Gipe, The Great Wind Rush of 99, NEW ENERGY, Feb. 1999, available at 
http://www.ilr.tu-berlin.de/WKA/windnet/99rush.html. 
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3.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 
The economic conditions that encouraged the recent boom in wind 
energy capacity have evaporated with the onset of the recession.  As 
mentioned above, lending in general is frozen.  In addition, the main 
driver for investment in the wind industry, the PTC, is no longer 
desirable to lenders and investors who do not need tax credits to offset 
their income now that they have losses.  To make matters worse, the 
IRS issued a Notice on September 30, 2008, that exempted financial 
institutions from the built-in loss limitations in I.R.C. § 382.177  This 
change allowed a bank that purchased another bank to offset future 
income with any losses from loans or bad debt obtained in the 
merger.178  Under the Notice, banks not only had their own losses to 
carry forward to future profitable years, but they could also easily 
acquire the losses of other banks for the same purpose, further 
reducing their appetite for purchasing tax credits like the PTC. 
Finally, the demand for fossil fuel has dropped and with it the 
prices to purchase coal and natural gas to produce electricity.  Like 
the rest of the country, wind energy is in trouble.  ARRTA 
specifically addresses some of the challenges facing the wind 
industry, and its provisions will help the industry to weather the worst 
of the recession.  However, permanent energy legislation is needed to 
secure long-term profitability in the wind energy industry. 
a.  Production Tax Credit Extension and Alternatives 
There are three important sections in ARRTA that significantly 
recalibrate the effectiveness of federal support for wind energy.  First, 
section 1101 extends the PTC for wind energy production an 
additional three years through the end of 2012. 179  Second, section 
1102 allows a taxpayer to opt to take a thirty percent ITC in lieu of 
the PTC.180  Third, section 1603 allows a qualifying taxpayer to apply 
to the Secretary of the Treasury for a grant in the amount of the ITC 
 
177 I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905. 
178 Stephen L. Feldman, Notice 2008-83: The IRS Offers Reassurance to Troubled 
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179 American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 
1101(a)(1), § 45(d)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 319. 
180 Id. sec. 1102(a), § 48(a)(5), 123 Stat. at 319–20. 
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that the taxpayer would otherwise be able to take under section 
1102.181 
In order to qualify for the thirty percent investment credit for 
“qualified property” under section 1102 of ARRTA, the taxpayer 
must (1) “place[] in service”; (2) during tax years 2009, 2010, 2011, 
or 2012; (3) a “qualified investment credit facility,” which is defined 
as a wind facility that qualifies for the PTC.182  If a taxpayer qualifies 
and elects to take the ITC, the taxpayer relinquishes his right to claim 
the PTC for the same property.183  Finally, “qualified property” is 
defined as property, “with respect to which depreciation (or 
amortization in lieu of depreciation) is allowable,”184 that is either (1) 
“tangible personal property” or (2) “other tangible property.”185  
“Other tangible property” does not include “a building or its structural 
components” and must be “an integral part of the qualified investment 
credit facility.”186 
By definition, commercial wind farms that would otherwise be 
eligible for the PTC qualify for the ITC in section 1102.187  The 
turbines, blades, towers, and other equipment are depreciable 
property,188 integral to the production of wind energy, and make up 
most of the expense of a wind project.189  Therefore, the developer of 
a wind project will be able to elect the ITC and take a tax credit up 
front for much of the cost of the wind project.  It may also be possible 
that the developer will be able to count the cost of construction and 
installation of the wind facilities in calculating the basis of the 
qualifying property for the purposes of the ITC.190  
If a wind project qualifies for the PTC and therefore the ITC in 
section 1102, it will also qualify for the grants provided under section 
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1603.  These grants are available to a taxpayer “who places in service 
specified energy property” either during 2009 or 2010, or “if the 
construction of such property began during 2009 or 2010, after 2010 
but before 2013.”191  The amount of the grant is “the applicable 
percentage of the basis of such property.”192  For wind, the applicable 
percentage is thirty percent, and the basis will be the cost of 
purchasing the wind machine components and other property at the 
site reduced by any depreciation taken in previous tax years.193  If a 
wind energy producer’s grant application is approved, the Secretary 
of Treasury will release the grant payment either within sixty days of 
applying for the grant or within sixty days of the energy property 
being placed in service, whichever is later.194 
If the property “ceases to be specified energy property,” the 
Secretary of the Treasury can determine whether there is cause to 
recapture a portion of the grant.195  By electing to receive a grant, the 
taxpayer may not claim a credit for the same wind energy property 
under the PTC or ITC.196  Finally, a grant made under section 1603 
will not be treated as gross income; it will instead reduce the basis of 
the qualifying property.197  However, the reduction in basis will only 
be half of the credit because the grants will be treated like energy 
credits under section 50(c)(3) of the Code.198 
b.  Repeal of I.R.S. Notice 2008-83 
In the early stages of the financial crisis on September 30, 2008, 
the I.R.S. issued Notice 2008-83.199  The Notice was aimed at 
spurring bank consolidation at a time when many banks were 
faltering.200  In order to make consolidation more attractive, the 
Notice excluded losses on loans and bad debts acquired in a bank 
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merger from the definition of “built-in losses” in section 382 of the 
Code.201  By doing so, the I.R.S. effectively ruled that by purchasing 
one of its competitors, a bank could lock in the target bank’s losses on 
bad loans and carry those losses forward to offset future income.202 
Many congressional leaders were angered by the Notice, and it is 
no surprise that they repealed it in ARRTA.203  Unfortunately, 
ARRTA does not make the repeal retroactive, so the banks that 
consolidated between September 30, 2008, and January 16, 2009, will 
be able to rely on the Notice and carry forward the acquired banks’ 
built-in losses.204  Several major bank mergers occurred during the 
last months of 2008,205 and because the repeal was not made 
retroactive, these mergers may pose a problem for renewable energy 
producers who rely on bank interest in the PTC to attract financing.  
c.  ARRTA’s Impact 
Under ARRTA, a renewable energy developer who builds a 
project that would normally qualify for the PTC between 2009 and 
2013 is now able to select from a menu of options to fit his and his 
investor’s particular financial situation.  If either party involved in the 
deal has a reliable income that they would like to offset over a period 
of several years, the PTC might still be the best option.  However, as 
discussed above, monetizing the PTC, such that it qualifies for the 
safe harbor in I.R.S. Bulletin 2007-45, requires a complex partnership 
arrangement with high transactional costs that eat into the benefit.  If 
the developer or investor has an immediate appetite for tax credits, 
they can opt to take the thirty percent ITC and take their tax benefit in 
one lump sum.  Finally, if neither the developer nor the investor has 
any use for the tax credits, the developer can ask the government to 
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reimburse him for thirty percent of the cost of the wind machines and 
other equipment that are part of the wind project.206 
 This new menu of options will help wind energy developers to 
attract investors because they allow developers and investors to 
construct a deal that will serve the specific needs of the parties 
involved.  Taken with the unique situation that each individual wind 
machine in a wind farm is considered a separate qualifying facility 
under section 45 of the Code, developers and investors constructing 
multi-facility wind projects should be able to mix and match these 
new incentives to create even more interesting options.  For instance, 
in a project with one hundred wind machines, the developer and 
investor could elect a grant for half of the machines and split the other 
half between the PTC and the ITC.  By splitting the project up in such 
a way, the developer and investor could immediately recoup about 
fifteen percent of the installation cost of the entire project through 
government grants, take an immediate tax credit for approximately 
seven and a half percent of the project, and guarantee a steady stream 
of tax credits over the next ten years for the energy produced by a 
quarter of the project’s facilities. 
 As generous as ARRTA’s provisions are, because of the short time 
frame in which they are available, they are not likely to initiate the 
installation of much new capacity beyond what was already in the 
works before the recession hit.  For instance, to take advantage of the 
grants, a developer would have to break ground before 2011.  If they 
had not already started working on a project, they would be hard-
pressed to get through selecting the site, designing the project, lining 
up investors, and acquiring the necessary permits in time to break 
ground before the deadline.  In all likelihood, the newly sweetened 
pot of incentives will serve to jump start languishing projects, help 
unfinanced projects find investors, and convince developers to dust 
off old projects that had been shelved.  If ARRTA’s provisions can 
accomplish that, it will have succeeded at preventing a collapse of the 
industry. 
 
206 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, secs. 1102(a), 1603, § 
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III 
SUGGESTED POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE A STRONGER WIND 
ENERGY INDUSTRY 
The federal government must send a strong signal to the energy 
industry that it is willing to make a long-term commitment to 
developing renewable energy.  Up to this point, Congress has 
approved a fair-weather energy tax policy that supports the industry 
during times of high fossil fuel prices and abandons it as soon as 
conventional fuels have dropped in price.  The uncertainty created by 
fluctuating energy prices and intermittent government support has 
stunted the industry’s growth, slowed its ability to become 
competitive with traditional fuels, and prevented the big players in the 
energy industry from taking seriously the need to reform their 
business models to include more renewable energy. 
To be sure, the provisions in ARRTA are a good first step, but 
ARRTA fails to offer any long-term, comprehensive solution to our 
energy dilemma.  In order to put the industry on notice, Congress 
must pass a comprehensive renewable energy package that includes: 
(1) reform and renewal of the PTC for eight years and (2) market and 
financing solutions that protect the renewable energy industry from 
swings in traditional energy prices and provide access to capital for 
renewable energy projects, even during tight credit markets. 
A.  Reform the PTC 
Although the PTC is not as beneficial during a recession, it has 
been a useful tool during better economic times and should not be 
abandoned.  However, the PTC has three main drawbacks that can be 
addressed by reforming the statute: First, making the wind industry 
face the possibility of the PTC’s expiration every year or two creates 
inefficiency and instability in its growth and fosters cycles of booms 
and busts.207  Second, the PTC only applies to new facilities and does 
not encourage renovating and upgrading aging facilities.  Third, it 
does not allow companies to combine all federal and state incentives 
and makes it difficult for states to compete with each other to attract 
renewable energy companies. 
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1.  Extended Extensions and Expanded Definitions 
In order to qualify, a facility must have been placed in service 
during a specified period of time.208  If a company misses that 
specified period and the PTC is not extended, then that company 
cannot benefit from the PTC even if the facility was nearly completed 
at the time of the expiration.  Because of this risk, wind energy 
companies anticipate the sunset date of the PTC and only start 
projects that they are sure can be completed within the specified 
period.209  Companies wait for an extension of the PTC if they are 
unsure whether they can finish before the sunset date, and they also 
shy away from ambitious, large-scale wind projects that would take 
several years to develop.210  Short-term extensions create an incentive 
to start building early in the year, which creates a cyclical demand for 
the manufacturing and construction industries that build and install 
the wind turbines.211 
To address the numerous issues raised by short-term extensions, 
Congress should increase the length of the extensions from one or two 
years to eight years.  Also, Congress should borrow the timing criteria 
in section 1603 of ARRTA by expanding the definition of “qualified 
facility” in section 45 of the Code to include facilities that were put 
into production no longer than two years after the sunset date of the 
PTC so long as those facilities were under construction before it 
expired. 
In the 2008 Bailout Bill, Congress approved an eight-year 
extension of the PTC for solar energy.212  While the three-year 
extension for wind energy in ARRTA is a step in the right direction, 
an eight-year extension would allow the wind industry to begin 
projects at a time of the year selected for business reasons rather than 
tax planning reasons and give the industry time enough to develop 
larger wind projects.213 
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However, a long-term extension would be preferable over making 
the PTC permanent.  While a permanent PTC would be an 
improvement over the current short-term extensions, it could pose a 
problem when the wind industry no longer needs the PTC to make it 
competitive with traditional energy because it will become an 
entitlement held by an entrenched and powerful industry, much like 
the favorable tax treatment the oil industry receives for new oil 
exploration. 
If Congress retains nonpermanent PTCs and expands the definition 
of “qualifying facility” to include facilities that are “substantially 
complete” by the sunset date, it would prevent the slowdowns created 
in anticipation of the PTCs renewal.  “Substantially complete” would 
be defined as a facility that was under construction as of the sunset 
date and that was put into production within two years of the PTC’s 
expiration.  Expanding the definition would reduce uncertainty about 
whether a project could be completed on time and would shrink the 
window of time near the sunset date when companies avoid starting 
construction. 
2.  PTC for Upgrades and Renovations 
Upgrading or renovating previously installed capacity that is either 
using obsolete technology or is nonoperational would be a cost 
effective and quick way of creating new MWs of wind energy.214  
Replacing nonoperational or obsolete windmills would be a very 
streamlined process because there would be none of the usual siting 
issues that exist for new facilities.  Additionally, if a wind farm had 
operated at the location for any period of time, the developer and 
lender would be able to evaluate the performance at the site and make 
an educated decision regarding its potential for consistent production 
of wind energy. 
Unfortunately, the PTC limits eligible facilities to those originally 
brought online during the eligibility period.215  While it is helpful that 
the IRS allows a facility containing twenty percent or less used 
materials to qualify anew for the PTC,216 it creates an incentive for 
developers that are looking to upgrade to scrap much of an existing 
wind machine in order to meet the twenty percent requirement.  
Upgrading wind energy producing facilities is an excellent means of 
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adding new MWs of electricity to the grid, and the government should 
encourage developers to do so while reusing as much of the existing 
facility as possible. 
Congress could easily expand upon the IRS’s ruling on the 
definition of “in service” and create an “upgrade PTC” to cover new 
wind energy brought online by improvements to existing 
infrastructure (for example, more efficient turbines and higher 
carrying capacity electrical grids).  The upgrade PTC would be 
limited to the amount of new electricity produced as a result of the 
upgrade, thereby preventing wind energy companies from renewing 
their full PTC for installing frivolous upgrades.  To determine the 
amount of production attributable to the upgrade, the taxpayer would 
subtract the average annual output during the pre-upgraded years of 
the wind machine from the annual output of the wind machine after 
the upgrade.  This amount would be calculated annually, and the 
taxpayer would be eligible for the PTC for ten years beginning in the 
tax year when the upgraded or renovated wind machine was placed in 
service. 
For sites where the developer replaces nonoperational wind 
machines, the PTC would be available again in full.  However, the 
replacement PTC would require that the machines had been offline 
for several years so that the allure of renewing the PTC for a 
functioning wind farm would not compel a wind farm owner to shut 
down in order to qualify for the full replacement PTC. 
3.  Allow Federal and State Incentives to Work Together 
The federal government should encourage state level policies that 
provide incentives for building new wind capacity.  If the PTC is 
reduced dollar-for-dollar based on state level support, then no 
additional incentive is provided to renewable energy companies, and 
the burden of promoting renewable energy is merely shifted from the 
federal to the state budget.  This restriction in the PTC creates 
disincentives for state legislatures to provide certain types of support 
to renewable energy producers and ties legislators’ hands from using 
tax policy to compete with other states to attract green economic 
development.  The federal government should welcome state level 
support and amend the PTC to allow businesses to combine the PTC 
with tax incentives on the state and local levels. 
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B. Creating a Market for Wind Energy 
Congress must pass legislation that curbs the market forces that 
make the wind industry’s success dependent on high energy prices.  
Past legislation, like PURPA, has focused on developing alternative 
energy as a means of lowering short-term electricity costs.  New 
legislation should take a more long-term view by recognizing that the 
price of electricity produced through high emission sources of energy 
does not fully reflect the actual cost to society and that, by avoiding 
this cost, wind energy provides a benefit to society not reflected in its 
price.  Additionally, any new policy aimed at creating a market for 
wind energy should recognize that increased wind energy capacity 
helps dampen the price fluctuations created by fossil fuel demand.  
The goal of this legislation would be to create a market for wind 
energy, no matter what the cost of traditional energy, and make 
installing new wind capacity profitable during times when it would be 
financially cheaper to rely on traditional power plants. 
The two most common solutions that have been discussed in policy 
circles in the United States are carbon taxes and cap-and-trade, the 
latter of which was a major part of President Obama’s campaign 
platform.217  In Europe, many countries have approached this problem 
using feed-in tariffs, which set the price buyers must pay for 
renewable energy, and then slowly reduce that price.218  Another 
potential way to create a market for renewable energy is to put in 
place a national renewable portfolio standard (RPS) that requires 
electricity in the United States to be derived from a set percentage of 
renewable sources by a certain date (for example, twenty-five percent 
renewable energy by 2025).  A full discussion of carbon taxes, cap-
and-trade regimes, feed-in tariffs, and RPSs is outside the scope of 
this Note, but the merits of each of these policies are discussed and 
compared in numerous scholarly works.219 
Minor tweaks to the PTC and a few billion dollars of government 
support will not be enough to effect a drastic change in U.S. energy 
production.  In order to create a lasting market for and ensure the 
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long-term viability of renewable energy, Congress must implement 
one of these major shifts in energy policy.  This will be no easy task 
because during the recession there will be little political will to move 
forward on something so drastic for fear that these policies could 
hamper the economic recovery.  Despite the likely political 
challenges, President Obama renewed his commitment to institute a 
cap-and-trade regime during his first address to a joint session of 
Congress, asking members of Congress to send him “legislation that 
places a market-based cap on carbon pollution.”220  While Congress 
has not passed cap-and-trade legislation as of the time of this writing, 
the 2010 budget—approved in April 2009—included a revenue 
stream from cap-and-trade in anticipation of the passage of such 
legislation.221  It is an excellent sign that President Obama and a 
majority of the Democrats in Congress support moving forward with 
such legislation.  However, cap-and-trade will likely face a stronger 
challenge than did either the Bailout Bill or ARRTA from the 
Republican opposition and even some moderate Democrats. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
While the economic crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession have 
threatened to halt the historic rise of the U.S. wind energy industry, 
they have also created an unprecedented opportunity for the United 
States’ new Democratic leadership to pass sweeping legislation that 
drastically changes the country’s economic and energy future.  In 
fashioning his vision for renewed American prosperity, President 
Barack Obama must make a strong commitment to realizing the 
promise of a new green economy and pass legislation that will allow 
the wind industry to be a part of the solution to the current recession 
rather than one of its symptoms.  The patchwork of energy legislation 
found in the Bailout Bill and ARRTA will only temporarily stop the 
bleeding.  Comprehensive energy reform is necessary to lay the 
groundwork for a strong, stable, and sustainable economy built on 
renewable energy. 
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